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Abstract How wrong is it to deceive a person into having sex with you? The
common view seems to be that this depends on the nature of the deception. If it
involves something very important, such as your identity, then the wrong done is
very serious. But if it involves something more trivial, such as your natural hair
colour, then the wrong seems less great. Tom Dougherty rejects this view. He argues
that sexual deception is always seriously wrong. In this paper, I present a response
to Doughterty’s argument. I propose an analysis of the wrongness in deception
according to which acts of deception, in sexual relations and elsewhere, may differ
in their degree of wrongness, and some may not be seriously wrong.
Keywords Deception  Consent  Deal-breakers  Sex
1 Introduction
Among the various means by which we influence the behaviour of others, one of the
least reputable may be deception. By deceiving a person, we may induce her to do
what she would not have done otherwise, had she known the truth. Deception seems
generally wrong. But the matter might not be black and white. Some acts of
deception seem less wrong than others; some, perhaps, are not wrong at all. Suppose
you give your arachnophobic friend a false assurance that there are no spiders in the
woods so that she will enjoy a pleasant walk that otherwise she would have been too
afraid to take. (The spiders are so well hidden that your friend will never know they
are there.) This seems at most a minor wrong. On the other hand, if you
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misrepresent yourself as a bank manager to an elderly pensioner so as to defraud
him of his life savings, then this is very wrong.
Deception also occurs in sexual relationships. People sometimes exaggerate,
embellish, or flat-out lie to get other people to have sex with them. Here, too,
common opinion seems to recognise a spectrum of wrongness. Contrast two cases:
Case 1 Alice, a Democrat, dislikes Republicans so much that she would never
knowingly have sex with one. She meets a man who professes not to be a
Republican, though in fact he is. They enjoy a pleasurable evening
together, culminating in sex.
Case 2 Bert’s wife has an identical twin sister who tricks him into having sex
with her by impersonating his wife.
Assume, in both cases, the sex is enjoyable and neither Alice nor Bert will later
come to regret the encounter if they do not discover the deception. The wrong done
to Bert seems much worse than that done to Alice. At least this I take to be the
common view, what most people would think.
Dougherty (2013) challenges this orthodoxy, which he calls the ‘‘Lenient
Thesis’’. He argues that all instances of deceiving a person into sex are seriously
wrong. He summarises his argument as follows:
1. Having sex with someone, while lacking her morally valid consent, is seriously
wrong.
2. Deceiving another person into sex involves having sex with that person, while
lacking her morally valid consent.
3. Therefore, deceiving someone into sex is seriously wrong. (Dougherty 2013,
720)
I shall defend the Lenient Thesis. I aim to show that Dougherty’s argument is
unsound. However, rather than objecting directly to one its premises, I shall pursue
a more indirect strategy. I begin by proposing an independent argument for the
orthodox view. This will involve developing an analysis of wrongness in deception.
I shall then consider which of Dougherty’s premises to reject in light of this
analysis.
Dougherty explicitly rejects a harm-based view of the wrongness in sexual
deception. Clearly, if sexual deception is wrong just insofar as it causes harm, then
some acts of sexual deception are more wrong than others, since some cause more
harm. Dougherty, however, rejects this view. He argues that some harmless acts of
sexual deception (e.g., where the deception goes undiscovered) are nonetheless
seriously wrong. The wrongness in sexual deception is better explained, he argues,
by the absence of valid consent (Dougherty 2013, 724–727). I am more sympathetic
to the harm-based view. However, I shall, for argument’s sake, set that view aside
here. I aim to show that, even if we explain the wrongness in sexual deception in
terms of consent, we may distinguish different degrees of wrongness.
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2 Deal-breakers and degrees
Dougherty focuses on cases in which a person agrees to sex as a result of being
deceived about a ‘‘deal-breaker’’. A deal-breaker, roughly, is a fact about a person’s
prospective sexual partner such that the person would not agree to sex were she to
learn this fact. Since Alice would not knowingly agree to sex with a Republican, the
fact that a person is a Republican is a deal-breaker for her. My aim in this section is
to argue that not all deal-breakers are equal. Some are stronger than others.
2.1 An analysis of deal-breaker strength
Here is my proposal in broad outline. A deal-breaker, in Dougherty’s words, is ‘‘a
feature of the sexual encounter to which the other person’s will is opposed’’
(Dougherty 2013, 719). But opposition is a matter of degree: a person’s will may
more strongly oppose some features than others. The strength of opposition may be
revealed in situations of uncertainty or risk, where the feature is not known either to
be present or absent. We may then see how great a risk of choosing an option with
this feature the person is willing to take. The greater is this risk, the weaker is her
opposition, and hence the weaker is her deal-breaker.
Consider, for example, deal-breakers in a different context. For a vegan, the fact
that a meal contains animal products is a deal-breaker with respect to eating it. A
vegan is someone who would not knowingly consume animal products. But some
vegans are more commited than others. Imagine two vegans, Fiona and Michael.
One day, they visit their friend, Hugh, who has prepared a meal for them. Being
somewhat absent-minded, however, Hugh is not sure whether he made his pasta
with vegan pesto. ‘‘I’m pretty sure it said ‘vegan’ on the jar,’’ he says with little
conviction. Michael is not deterred: ‘‘That’s good enough for me,’’ he says as he
tucks in. But Fiona is more cautious: ‘‘Well, if you’re not certain, then I’d rather not
take the risk.’’ Assume that, were there no doubt as to the vegan-friendliness of the
meal, Fiona and Michael would be equally eager to consume it. They are equally
hungry, equally fond of Hugh’s cooking, and so on.
We may infer from their choices that Fiona is the more committed vegan. Her
will opposes the consumption of animal products more strongly than Michael’s
does. Notice, however, the difference between Fiona and Michael is not whether the
presence of animal products is a deal-breaker. Michael, like Fiona, would not eat
Hugh’s pasta if he knew it contained animal products.1 The difference, rather, is that
in situations such as this, where they do not know either way, Michael is prepared to
risk eating animal products, but Fiona is not. It seems quite natural to say, therefore,
that this is a greater deal-breaker for Fiona than for Michael.
Using the tools of decision theory, we may define a measure of deal-breaker
strength along these lines. We can ask how great a risk of eating animal products a
1 One might dispute whether this fact alone suffices to make Michael a genuine vegan. But that’s not the
issue here. What is important is that the presence of animal products is a deal-breaker for Michael,
according to Dougherty’s definition.
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person will take. The greater is this risk, the smaller is the deal breaker. The
decision in the above example can be represented as follows:
There are two possible states of the world: either the food is non-vegan (i.e.,
containing animal products), or it is vegan. Let the probability of the former be p,
and the latter ð1 pÞ. The agent may choose either to eat the food or not. The
outcome of each action in each state is shown in the table. If the agent chooses to eat
the food and it is non-vegan, then her hunger will be satisfied, but she will have
acted immorally, by the ethical standards of veganism. (Assume she is a vegan on
ethical grounds.) If she chooses to eat the food and it is vegan, then she will be both
satisfied and moral. Finally, if she chooses not to eat the food, then she will be
unsatisfied but moral in either case. (Assume there is no other food to eat.)
Let us write S for satisfied and M for moral. The presence of animal products is a
deal-breaker for the agent if she prefers S&M to :S&M, and prefers :S&M to
S&:M. If she is certain the food is non-vegan (p ¼ 1), then she prefers not to eat it;
but if she is certain the food is vegan (p ¼ 0), her preference is reversed.
We may then consider intermediate cases, where 0\p\1. These are cases of
uncertainty or risk. We may assume that increasing the value of p will reduce the
agent’s inclination to eat the food. That is, if she prefers to eat the food for some
value of p, then she will also prefer this for any lower value. We may then ask what
is the maximum value of p for which she prefers to eat the food (or, more precisely,
what is the least upper bound of the values of p for which this holds). The greater is
this maximum value, the smaller is the deal-breaker. Fiona’s maximum, for
example, is lower than Michael’s.
Suppose the agent’s preferences are represented by an expectational utility
function U. Then the strength of her deal-breaker is given by the ratio:
Uð:S&MÞ  UðS&:MÞ
UðS&MÞ  UðS&:MÞ
The greater is this ratio, the smaller is the risk she is willing to take, and hence the
stronger is her deal-breaker. To illustrate, suppose Fiona’s and Michael’s utilities
are as shown in the following table:
Actions States
Non-vegan (p) Vegan (1 p)
Eat Satisfied & Immoral Satisfied & Moral
Don’t eat Unsatisfied & Moral Unsatisfied & Moral
Utility Deal-breaker
S&M :S&M S&:M strength
Fiona 12 10 2 0.8
Michael 16 4 1 0.2
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Fiona and Michael do not differ with respect to the order of the three outcomes:
both say S&M is best, S&:M is worst, and :S&M is in the middle. The presence of
animal products is thus at least a weak deal-breaker for both. Their wills oppose the
consumption of animal products to at least some degree. However, they differ with
respect to the location of the middle option vis-a`-viz the other two: Fiona has it
closer to the top; Michael has it closer to the bottom.2 (A more general definition of
this measure is given in the ‘‘Appendix’’.)
This provides a precise numerical measure of deal-breaker strength on a ratio
scale. It enables us to say, for example, than one deal-breaker is twice as strong as
another. However, the measure rests on assumptions that may be controversial. It
assumes, in particular, that a person’s ‘‘will’’ is aptly represented by her preferences
over ‘‘lotteries’’. In the above example, the agents’ preferences over lotteries
involving some risk of consuming animal products are taken to show how much
veganism matters to these agents. One reason to doubt this is that it is insensitive to
the agents’ general attitudes to risk. If Michael is a thrill-seeker who likes to live life
on the edge, whereas Fiona is more conservative, then Michael’s greater
preparedness to risk eating animal products might not show that veganism matters
less to him.
I am unsure what to say about risk aversion in this context. It does not seem
obviously mistaken to say that risk-lovers generally have fewer or weaker deal-
breakers than others. But if this is problematic, then the measure might be modified
to avoid this implication. When we compare two agents with the same level of
general risk aversion (or we are comparing a single agent in two different
situations), the measure would remain as above. But in other cases, we might apply
a variable ‘‘discount rate’’ to the agent’s utilities which would correct for differences
in general risk aversion.
Still, even if such a modification could deal adequately with risk aversion, some
may object, more broadly, that the decision-theoretic approach taken here is
misguided. A person’s will is better understood in terms of the ordinary notion of
desire, rather than the technical notion of preference employed by decision theorists
and economists. When we say, for example, that veganism matters more to Fiona,
we simply mean that she has a stronger desire to avoid eating animal products. This
is easily comprehended without the need for utility functions and the like.3 This
objection raises important issues about the psychology of desires and preferences
which are beyond the scope of this essay. I should emphasise, however, that the
measure of deal-breaker strength I have proposed is separable from the more
general analysis of such strength on which it is based. This analysis says merely
that, as a deal-breaker is a feature to which a person’s will is opposed, the strength
of a deal-breaker correspondingly varies with the strength of the will’s opposition.
Precisely how one elaborates this notion of a person’s will opposing a feature is a
further issue. I have suggested one way of doing this, in decision-theoretic terms. A
2 This does of course presuppose interpersonal comparisons of utility (in particular, cardinal comparisons
of utility intervals).
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue.
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nice feature of this approach is that provides a way to define a measure of deal-
breaker strength. But this is inessential for my argument. The essential point is
merely that deal-breakers vary in strength.
A final note of clarification. On the analysis I am offering, certain patterns of
preferences are what determine the strength of a deal-breaker; they are not mere
evidence that the deal-breaker has a certain strength. Nonetheless, there is an
important epistemic element in the overall account. We cannot directly observe a
person’s preferences, and therefore, on this account, we cannot directly observe her
deal-breakers. Rather, we infer a person’s preferences, at least in part, from her
observed choice behaviour. When Fiona chooses not to eat the pasta, this reveals to
us something about her preferences, and thereby something about her deal-breakers.
I return to this issue below when discussing the question of wrongness in our two
cases of deceiving into sex.
2.2 An alternative analysis
Before continuing, I would like to compare the analysis proposed above with a
similar one suggested by Neil Manson, which also distinguishes stronger and
weaker deal-breakers. The extent to which these analyses are incompatible is not
entirely clear. But in any case, as I argue below, my proposal seems preferable,
because it offers a deeper explanation.
Manson explains his analysis as follows:
The gradable voluntariness theory takes into account the fact that some kinds
of deception may merely tip the balance in favor of deciding to consent.
Where deception tips the balance, the relevant counterfactual—if R were to
know that p she would not consent—is true, but the counterfactual is only
made true by a relatively small set of very close possible worlds. Suppose
R wouldn’t want to have sex with older men. S, aware of this, dyes his hair to
appear younger. Suppose R finds S attractive, witty, sexy. R willingly has sex
with S. There are some close possible worlds where R knows the facts about
S’s age and does not consent. But there are also close possible worlds where
R knows the facts and does consent (she might, e.g., revise her extant
preferences in light of new information: ‘‘Who knew? Not all old guys are
monsters!’’).
But deception can also lead the consenter to make a never-in-a-million-years
type of decision. Suppose S deceives a devoutly religious R—who would
rather die than have sex with a person outside her religion—into having sex,
by lying about his religion. Even if R has other reasons for consenting to sex
with S, there are no close possible worlds where R knows the truth about S’s
religion and R consents. In this example, unlike the one above, we have a
fantastically strong deal breaker. (Manson 2016, 419)
Suppose some fact F is a deal-breaker for R. To evaluate its strength, on
Manson’s account, we move from the actual world to the ‘‘closest’’ possible world
where F is not a deal-breaker for R. The greater the distance we must travel, through
modal space, the stronger is the deal-breaker. This raises two questions. First, when
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surveying other possible worlds, which facts must be held fixed and which are
allowed to vary? Second, how do we measure similarity, or ‘‘closeness’’, between
worlds? Though Manson does not explicitly supply these details, his parenthetical
comment—‘‘she might, e.g., revise her extant preferences’’—suggests the follow-
ing. The facts which are held fixed are those about the objects of R’s preferences
(e.g., facts about S, in Manson’s example), and the facts which are allowed to vary
are those about R’s preferences. The relevant measure of similarity, then, is between
preferences. The question is: holding fixed the other facts, how great a change in R’s
preferences would be required for F to cease being a deal-breaker for R?4
This raises the question of how to measure similarity between preference
relations. Perhaps the simplest approach is to count the number of common pairs.
For example, let % and %  be preference relations on a set of options X. Then we
may consider the cardinality of their intersection, i.e., of the set
fhx; yi 2 X2 : x% y ^ x% yg. The larger this set, the greater the similarity between
the preference relations. It is unclear, however, whether this will deliver the result
Manson wants in his two scenarios, i.e., that there is greater preference change in the
‘‘age’’ case than in the ‘‘religion’’ case. In either case, merely reversing R’s
preference over a single pair of options (i.e., having sex with S, and not doing so)
may be sufficient for the relevant fact to cease being a deal-breaker. So this simple
cardinality measure seems inadequate for Manson’s purposes.
Rather, Manson seems to assume a measure of preference change that takes into
account similarity between the objects of preferences. Such a measure may be fairly
intuitive. For example, suppose I prefer beer to wine, and, among beers, I prefer ale
to lager. Now consider two possible changes in my preferences. In the first, I
continue to prefer beer to wine, but I reverse my preference regarding ale and lager.
In the second, I continue to prefer ale to lager, but I reverse my preference regarding
beer and wine. It seems natural to say that the latter change is greater. A plausible
explanation is that ale is more similar to lager than beer is to wine.
In Manson’s first scenario, the relevant preference change involves R’s
preferences regarding older and younger men, whereas in the second scenario, it
involves R’s preferences regarding, say, Christians and non-Christians. It might be
said that, because there is in general more similarity between older men and younger
men than there is between Christians and non-Christians, the latter preference
change is greater, as required by Manson’s analysis.
However, it is doubtful that this analysis will work in cases like that of Fiona and
Michael above. In this case, the relevant preference change seems the same for
Fiona and Michael. For both of them, the preference change involves their
preferences regarding vegan food and non-vegan food. Whatever the degree of
similarity between vegan food and non-vegan food, this will be the same for Fiona
4 It might be objected that this interpretation puts too much emphasis on a mere parenthetical remark.
Perhaps, this remark notwithstanding, Manson does not intend closeness between worlds to be measured
in terms of similarity between preferences, or not solely in such terms. I do not deny that there may be a
more attractive interpretation. Notice, however, the concept of a deal-breaker suggests that preferences
must at least be a central part of the story. Dougherty defines a deal-breaker in terms of the agent’s will,
and it is natural to think of this as closely related to, if not constituted by, the agent’s preferences.
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and Michael. Yet, as I said above, it is plausible that Fiona’s deal-breaker is
stronger. It is unclear, therefore, whether Manson’s analysis can give a satisfactory
explanation of this case.
In any event, I think there is a good reason to prefer an analysis like the one I
have proposed to Manson’s alternative. Suppose, for argument’s sake, that there is a
difference in the ‘‘size’’ of preference change required for the presence of non-vegan
ingredients to cease being a deal-breaker for Fiona and Michael. Presumably, if this
is so, then it is due to some underlying difference in Fiona’s and Michael’s actual
preferences. A deeper explanation, therefore, will be one which identifies what this
actual difference may be. This is what my proposal attempts to do. It explains the
difference in deal-breaker strength between Fiona and Michael in terms of the their
actual preferences. Now, it might be the case that, given this difference in their
actual preferences, the size of preference change required for Fiona is greater than
that required for Michael, in which case Manson’s analysis may agree with mine.
But then mine would seem to give the deeper explanation. On the other hand, if the
two analyses do not agree, then mine seems more plausible.
2.3 Local versus global deal-breakers
The analysis above concerns what might be called ‘‘local’’ deal-breakers. It
concerns the extent to which a property is a deal-breaker in particular
circumstances. This might vary in different circumstances. Fiona might be more
willing to risk eating Hugh’s pasta were she very hungry; Michael might be less
willing to do so were Hugh known to be a bad cook. This might not sit well with our
ordinary notion of a ‘‘deal-breaker’’. We normally think of deal-breakers as being
more robust, not so sensitive to such changes in circumstances. It would be absurd
to say, for example, ‘‘I’m a vegan, but only when I’m not hungry.’’
To better capture the ordinary notion, we may also consider a ‘‘global’’
dimension of deal-breaking strength. A property might be a (local) deal-breaker in
one situation but not in another. We may thus think of its global strength as
determined by how broad or narrow is the range of situations in which it is a deal-
breaker. A maximally strong global deal-breaker—call it a ‘‘fundamental’’ deal-
breaker—is a local deal-breaker in all possible situations. Presumably, the presence
of animal products is not a fundamental deal-breaker even for most vegans. Few, I
assume, would starve to death rather than compromise their vegan scruples, for
example. We may be sceptical about the existence of any fundamental deal-
breakers. We may believe that ‘‘everyone has a price’’. For example, most people
say they would never eat human flesh, yet there are well-known cases of ordinary
people resorting to cannibalism in extreme circumstances.
Among non-fundamental global deal-breakers, we may distinguish weaker and
stronger: X is globally at least as strong as Y if and only if every situation in which Y
is a deal-breaker is also a situation in which X is a deal-breaker, i.e., DX  DY ,
where DX and DY are the sets of situations in which, respectively, X and Y are deal-
breakers. For example, the presence of meat may be for many vegans a stronger
deal-breaker than the presence of animal products. If a person would not choose to
eat animal products in a given situation, then a fortiori she would not choose to eat
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meat in the same situation. However, there may be situations in which, though she
would not choose to eat meat, she would choose to eat, say, cheese. Notice, this
gives us only a partial ordering of deal-breakers. In some cases, it may be that
neither DX  DY nor DX  DY holds. In such cases, we may want to compare the
relative size of DX and DY , but this will be difficult if, as seems likely, DX and DY
are both infinite.
As I say, this global definition may be closer to our ordinary notion. In what
follows, however, I will focus solely on local deal-breakers, since this seems closer
to what Dougherty has in mind. Moreover, it may be argued that, from the
standpoint of moral evaluation, local deal-breakers are more relevant, since the
moral evaluation of an action should attend to the particular features of the context
in which it occurs.
3 Wrongness in deception
What should we say about the wrongness in deception when we recognise that deal-
breakers vary in strength? The following seems a plausible view. If a person acts in
a way that morally requires the consent of another person, and this consent is
secured through deception regarding a deal-breaker, then the wrongness of this
action correlates positively with the strength of the deal-breaker. Actions which are
enabled by deception with respect to strong deal-breakers are more wrong those
enabled by deception with respect to weak deal-breakers. Moreover, some deal-
breakers are so weak that the associated wrong is not serious. I begin by giving a
general account of degrees of wrongness in deception, before applying this to the
central case of deceiving people into sex.
3.1 Degrees of wrongness
Suppose that Hugh knowingly serves pasta containing non-vegan pesto to his vegan
guests.When they express doubts about the vegan-friendliness of the food, he reassures
them by displaying an empty jar of vegan pesto which he claims to have used in
preparing the meal (though in fact he merely emptied the contents into the rubbish bin).
Then, it seems, Hugh has acted wrongly towards both Fiona and Michael. But, on my
proposal, the wrong done to Fiona is greater, because her deal-breaker is stronger. This
seems the right verdict. Hugh has, through his deception, induced Fiona andMichael to
act against their own preferences: they have eaten animal products when they would
have preferred not to do so. However, Fiona has acted against her preferences to a
greater extent than Michael has acted against his. The avoidance of eating animal
products matters more to Fiona. This is why Michael is willing to run a greater risk of
eating animal products. Fiona’s preference in this case is stronger thanMichael’s. Since
Hugh has induced Fiona to act against a stronger preference, he has wronged her more.
InDougherty’s terms, Hugh has engineered an outcome towhich Fiona’s andMicheal’s
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wills are opposed. But, since Fiona’s will is more strongly opposed to this outcome, the
wrong done to her is greater.
Now suppose that Michael is a very half-hearted vegan. He routinely orders
meals at restaurants after making only minimal efforts to confirm they are vegan-
friendly. ‘‘It’s probably okay’’, he says, though the information provided on the
menu is inconclusive. Although he would not knowingly consume animal products,
he has few qualms about risking it when he doesn’t know either way. His deal-
breaker is very weak. And suppose Hugh knows this, having observed Michael’s
behaviour in restaurants. Perhaps it is still wrong for Hugh to deceive Michael into
eating non-vegan food, but, I would say, it is not clearly a serious wrong.
This picture fits nicely with the general analysis of degrees of wrongness I have
developed elsewhere (Brown 2016).5 On this analysis, the degree of wrongness of
an action depends on how similar it is to a right (non-wrong) action. How different
would the action need to be for it to be right? For a given action A, consider an
action A such that (i) A is right, and (ii) A is at least as similar to A as any right
action.6 The more similar A is to A, the less wrong is A.7 Suppose, for example, A is
an action of wrongful deception about a deal-breaker. Then A may be an act that is
as similar as possible to A except it involves no deception. The relevant dimension
of similarity here may be the amount, or level, of deception involved in the action. It
seems natural to say that the amount of deception involved in A depends on the
strength of the deal-breaker. The stronger this is, the more deception is involved,
and hence the more dissimilar A is from A, and the more wrong is A.
It should be emphasised that, on this analysis, the wrongness of acts of deception
need not be correlated with the amount of harm they cause. Rather, wrongness
depends on the strength of deal-breaker involved. Of course, deal-breaker strength
does depend on the agent’s preferences. So, if harm simply consists in the
frustration of preferences, then it may be that deception with respect to stronger
deal-breakers causes greater harm. However, this is a non-essential feature of the
view. Given a non-preference-based account of harm—say, a hedonistic one—it
may be that, in some cases, deception with respect to a stronger deal-breaker causes
less harm than deception with respect to a weak deal-breaker.
3.2 Deception and sex
Return now to our examples of sexual deception. What does my proposal say about
these?
Consider first Case 1, in which Alice is deceived into having sex with a
Republican. We may plausibly infer that Republicanism is only a weak deal-breaker
for Alice. Everybody knows that in negotiations leading to casual sex, people are
5 Strictly speaking, this analysis is of degrees of rightness. However, applying it to wrongness instead is
straightforward.
6 This involves a slight simplification, since there might not exist an action satisfying these two
conditions. I suggest a more complicated version of the analysis to accommodate this possibility.
7 If A is itself right, then we may have A ¼ A. In that case, A is not wrong at all, because there is zero
dissimilarity between a thing and itself.
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not always entirely candid. A certain lack of candour might even be considered a
shared background assumption in this context, similar to that assumed in, say, poker
games or reference letters. When your poker opponent grimaces, apparently
revealing another bad hand, you know not to take this at face value. When a job
candidate’s reference letter declares that she ‘‘has the greatest philosophical mind
since Aristotle’’, you know to interpret this a meaning something closer to ‘‘she has
read some books by Aristotle.’’ Similarly, when a guy you met at a bar tells you he’s
36, you know he’s probably in his forties. If Alice has a one-night stand with a
man—even one who professes not to be a Republican—then she willingly takes a
nontrivial risk of having sex with a Republican. That he claims not to be a
Republican is, in this context, only weak evidence that he is not one. That she is
nonetheless willing to take this risk shows that Republicanism is not a strong deal-
breaker for her. If she is wronged, it is, therefore, not a serious wrong.
I should stress that this conclusion is defeasible. On the basis of observing
Alice’s choice behaviour, and certain background assumptions about her credences,
we may make reasonable inferences about her preferences over relevant ‘‘lotteries’’,
or uncertain prospects. These preferences, on the analysis proposed here, determine
the strength of her deal-breaker. It is possible, however, that further information
would show her that her preferences are different, and therefore that her deal-
breaker is, say, stronger.8 A related question is what Alice’s deceiver (the disguised
Republican) may reasonably infer about the strength of her deal-breaker. If he
reasonably infers that it is weak when in fact it is strong, then we might say that his
deception is less blameworthy, though still seriously wrong.9
Consider now Case 2, in which Bert is tricked into having sex with his wife’s
identical twin. Cases like this are extremely rare—certainly much rarer than cases like
Alice’s, involving run-of-the-mill deceptions. It is entirely reasonable for Bert to
believe, with high confidence, that the woman with whom he agrees to have sex is his
wife. He does not willingly take any significant risk of having sex with a different
person. Moreover, we may assume that, were he to begin to suspect that it was not his
wife, he would end the encounter immediately. That this woman is not in fact his wife
is therefore a strong deal-breaker for him, and the wrong done to him is
correspondingly a serious one.
3.3 Core and periphery
Dougherty argues that, in order to accept the Lenient Thesis, we must distinguish
‘‘core’’ and ‘‘peripheral’’ features of a sexual encounter (Dougherty 2013, 729).
8 Consider a version of this case in which Alice goes to very considerable lengths to confirm that her
prospective sexual partner is not a Republican: she interviews his family and friends; she calls the local
branch of the Republican party to ask about its membership list; and so on. And suppose that he goes to
equally great lengths to conceal his Republicanism: he instructs his family and friends to lie to Alice, and
so on. In this case, Alice’s deal-breaker is much stronger, and the wrong done to her correspondingly
more serious.
9 That deceiving into sex may sometimes be blameless yet still seriously wrong is discussed by
Dougherty (2013, 739–743).
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Serious wrongdoing occurs in cases of sexual deception involving core deal-
breakers, but not in those involving peripheral deal-breakers. He considers two
approaches to drawing this distinction. The first he calls ‘‘objective,’’ because it is
insensitive to individuals’ own views about what is important. For example, identity
may deemed a core feature, and political affiliation a peripheral feature, even though
for some individuals, identity may be less important than political affiliation. The
problem with this approach, he argues, is that it entails an unacceptably ‘‘moralistic
conception of sex’’ (Dougherty 2013, 730). It imposes certain views of sexual
morality on people who do not subscribe to these views. Dougherty favours instead
a ‘‘subjective’’ approach. He writes: ‘‘The most principled way to [distinguish core
and peripheral features] is to distinguish the features that someone considered
relevant to her decision to have sex from those that she considered irrelevant’’
(Dougherty 2013, 731). He then points out that any deal-breaker must, by definition,
concern a feature that the individual considers relevant. Thus all deal-breakers are
core features.
Notice, however, that the analysis I have proposed is, by Dougherty’s lights,
subjective. What is a strong deal-breaker for one person may be only a weak deal-
breaker, or no deal-breaker at all, for another. Even if core features are distinguished
from peripheral features by what individuals consider relevant, it does not follow
that this is a simple binary matter. For relevance may itself be a matter of degree.
When I buy socks, their colour is relevant to my decision, but not as relevant as
their size. When Alice chooses with whom to have sex, presumably many features
are relevant to her decision. One relevant feature is whether her prospective sexual
partner is a Republican. But it cannot be very high on her list of relevant features,
since she is willing to have sex with a man without good evidence that he is a not a
Republican. It is relevant, but not very relevant. The class of core features, which
give rise to serious wrongdoing, may thus be restricted to a proper subset of the
relevant features, including only those with sufficiently high relevance for the
person deceived.
3.4 Consent
I have argued above that sexual deception is not always seriously wrong. Where
does this leave the issue of consent? Recall Dougherty’s argument:
1. Having sex with someone, while lacking her morally valid consent, is seriously
wrong.
2. Deceiving another person into sex involves having sex with that person, while
lacking her morally valid consent.
3. Therefore, deceiving someone into sex is seriously wrong.
Which of the premises do I reject? This is not an easy question. It depends both
on the relation between deception and consent, and the relation between consent and
wrongness. On Dougherty’s view, deception always invalidates consent, and sex
without consent is always seriously wrong. One might reject either of these claims.
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First, one might say deception invalidates consent only when it involves a
sufficiently strong deal-breaker.10 This would be to reject Premise 2. However, this
may seem to misunderstand the widely accepted information requirement for valid
consent. The reason why valid consent entails informed consent is that a person
cannot validly consent to something if she does not know what she is consenting to.
A person cannot, for example, validly consent to participate in risky drug trials if
she does not know the risks. But if a person is deceived about a deal-breaker, even a
very small one, then she does not know what she is consenting to. Alice, for
example, does not know that she is consenting to have sex with a Republican. It
seems difficult to maintain, therefore, that her consent is nonetheless valid.
Second, one might say non-consensual sex is seriously wrong only when it results
from deception involving a sufficiently strong deal-breaker. This would be to reject
Premise 1. However, one might reasonably be reluctant to say that non-consensual
sex is sometimes only a minor wrong. As Dougherty point out, non-consensual sex
is taken by some to be the definition of rape (Dougherty 2013, 721), yet surely rape
is never only a minor wrong.
There is, however, a third possibility. We might say that violations of consent
also come in degrees. The wrongness of non-consensual sex depends on how non-
consensual it is. Sex that results from deception involving a strong deal-breaker is
non-consensual to a high degree, and is therefore seriously wrong, whereas sex that
results from deception involving a weak deal breaker is non-consensual to a low
degree, and is therefore not seriously wrong. On this approach, we should say that
Dougherty’s argument is equivocal. What is meant by ‘‘having sex with someone
while lacking her morally valid consent’’? Does this refer to sex that is non-
consensual to a high degree (involving a strong deal-breaker), or to a low degree
(involving a weak deal-breaker). If the former, then we should reject Premise 2; if
the latter, Premise 1.
The idea that acts may be non-consensual to a greater or lesser degree seems
fairly intuitive. Suppose I employ you to paint my house. You show me the tins of
paint you will use, which, according to their labels, are the colour I have carefully
selected, a particular shade of white called ‘‘Snow White.’’ If you have
surreptitiously filled the tins with cheaper paint of a slightly different colour,
‘‘Periwinkle White,’’ then you act to some extent without my consent when you
paint my house. But not to the same extent as if the paint was bright purple. It seems
natural to say that, though both acts of house painting are to some extent non-
consensual, the latter is more so than the former. It also seems natural to say that
latter is more wrong than the first.
I should stress that this argument is intended to apply only to cases in which
consent is invalidated by deception. It does not apply to cases where a person is
forced or coerced to do something against her will. Deception and force seem
importantly different. In cases of deception, we may say that the victim thought she
was consenting to one thing, X, when in fact she consented to something else, Y. In
considering the extent of non-consensual action, it therefore makes sense to take
10 This I take to be the position of Manson (2016).
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into account how great the difference is between X and Y. In a case of force,
however, the victim may know perfectly well what she has and has not consented to.
For this reason, the account of degrees I have suggested seems less appropriate in
cases of force.
4 Conclusion
I have argued that acts of wrongful deception, in sexual relations and elsewhere,
may vary in their degree of wrongness. In some cases, the degree of wrongness
might be so small that we would not regard the deception as ‘‘seriously’’ wrong. My
argument rests on a proposed analysis of this variation, whereby the degree of
wrongness depends on the strength of the deal-breaker involved, as may be revealed
by a person’s behaviour in risky situations. This view can, I have argued, be
reconciled with a plausible account of consent. None of this should be taken as a
general defence of deception. Many acts of deception surely are seriously wrong,
and my analysis is entirely consistent with this. It is also compatible with the view
that all acts of deception are wrong to at least some degree.
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Appendix
This appendix gives a more general treatment of the analyses suggested in Sects. 2.1
and 2.3.
Local deal-breakers
In my formal analysis, deal-breakers will be propositions. Let X be a finite set of
states (finite for simplicity). A proposition X is a subset of X. Let A be a set of
actions. For each a 2 A, let there be a value function Va : X! R, where VaðxÞ
represents the value of performing a in x.
The agent’s ex ante degrees of belief, prior to receiving any testimony, are given
by a regular probability function P on 2X. (By saying P is regular, I mean that
PðXÞ ¼ 0 only if X ¼ ;.) The ex ante expected value of action a is thus
EP½Va ¼
X
x2X
VaðxÞPðxÞ ð1Þ
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Now suppose the agent receives testimony that proposition X is true (where
X 6¼ ;), and updates her degrees of belief by conditionalising on X. So her new
probability function is PX , where, for all Y,
PXðYÞ ¼ PðY jXÞ ð2Þ
The new expected value of a is thus
EPX ðVaÞ ¼
X
x2X
VaðxÞPðxÞ
PðXÞ
ð3Þ
We may contrast this with the case where the agent instead receives testimony
that X is false, and so conditionalises on X, the negation (or complement) of X. It
may be that the agent’s preference regarding actions a and b ‘‘reverses’’ when
switching from the former case to the latter: when she conditionalises on X, she
prefers a to b, whereas when she conditionalises on X, she prefers b to a. This means
that X is a deal-breaker for her.
More precisely, X is a deal-breaker favouring a over b if the following two
inequalities hold
EPX ½Va  Vb[ 0 ð4Þ
EP
X
½Va  Vb\0 ð5Þ
An immediate consequence of these definitions is that if X is a deal-breaker
favouring a over b, then X is a deal-breaker favouring b over a. And the strength of
the former is inversely related to the strength of the latter.
Suppose that X is in fact false, but the agent is deceived into believing it is true.
Then she will prefer a to b, but would have had the reverse preference had she
known the truth. In this way, deception with respect to a deal-breaker may induce a
person to act against her ‘‘true’’ preferences.
The above analysis is somewhat crude. It assumes testimony has the effect of
raising the agent’s credence in some proposition to the level of certainty (e.g.,
PXðXÞ ¼ 1). But of course this is unrealistic. So suppose now that the agent receives
testimony that is insufficient to make her certain that X true, but rather leads her to
assign X probability k. If she then updates her degrees of belief according to Jeffrey
Conditionalisation, her new probability function will be PX;k, where for all Y,
PX;kðYÞ ¼ kPðYjXÞ þ ð1 kÞPðY jXÞ ð6Þ
And the expected value of a becomes
EPX;k ½Va ¼
X
x2X
VaðxÞðkPðxjXÞ þ ð1 kÞPðxjXÞÞ ð7Þ
¼ kEPX ½Va þ ð1 kÞEPX ½Va ð8Þ
We may consider the difference EX;k½Va  Vb for varying values of k. This
difference is given by
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EX;k½Va  Vb ¼ ðkEPX ½Va þ ð1 kÞEPX ½VaÞ
 ðkEPX ½Vb þ ð1 kÞEPX ½VbÞ
ð9Þ
¼ kEPX ½Va  Vb þ ð1 kÞEPX ½Va  Vb ð10Þ
Suppose X is a deal-breaker favouring a over b, as defined above. So (4) and (5)
both hold. It follows that
signðEX;k½Va  VbÞ ¼
1 k[ r
0 k ¼ r
1 k\r
8><
>:
ð11Þ
where
r ¼
EP
X
½Vb  Va
EP
X
½Vb  Va þ EPX ½Va  Vb
ð12Þ
Thus the ratio r represents the lowest probability such that the agent may assign
this probability to X without preferring b to a. We may therefore use r as a measure
of the strength of X as a deal-breaker favouring a over b. The smaller is r, the
stronger is the deal-breaker.
Global deal-breakers
Clearly, on the above analysis, whether a proposition is a deal-breaker depends on
what I called the ex ante probability function. X may be a deal-breaker relative to
one probability function P, but not relative to another P0. In this way, the analysis
concerns what I earlier called local deal-breakers. These deal-breakers are localised
to particular circumstances, represented here by particular ex ante probability
functions.
As I suggested, we can also consider global deal-breakers. The deal-breaking
strength of a proposition, in a global sense, depends on how broad or narrow is the
class of circumstances relative to which it is a deal-breaker in the local sense. At one
extreme, we have what I called fundamental deal-breakers. X is a fundamental deal-
breaker if, for every (regular) probability function P, X is a deal-breaker relative to
P. For actions a, b, define
Xa[ b ¼ fx : VaðxÞ[VbðxÞg ð13Þ
Thus Xa[ b is the set of all states in which performing a is better than performing b.
Then X is a fundamental deal-breaker, favouring a over b, if and only if Xa[ b ¼ X
and Xb[ a 6¼ ;.
We can also give a partial order of propositions representing their strength as
global deal-breakers. The global strength of X as a deal-breaker favouring a over b
is at least as great as that of Y if, for every probability function P, if Y is a deal-
breaker favouring a over b relative to P, then so is X. This will be the case if
X \ Xa[ b  Y \ Xa[ b and X \ Xb[ a  Y \ Xb[ a.
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